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PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS 
To the best of Defendant/Appellee's knowledge, there are no prior or related appeals. 
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HURT OF APPEALS 
THE ESTATE OF EDWIN HIGLEY, 
V. 
yr ^ i L. ui uTAll, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
eai iiuijj a J uiii: juu^ii^ui ,d the Second Judicial District Court 
n -,nr? fnr Weber County, Ogden Department, State of Utah, 
Honorable W. Brent West, Presiding 
BRII.il' OF- U'I'ELLEE 
J URISDIC I ION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a Final Judgment entered by the Second Judicial District 
Court on March 23, 2009 (R. 564-66) (Addendum A, aitaeiiajj 111c fudgim JJH iiismi1 > i 
with prejudiiL and n ils in(in'(\ PLiiuliff1"; .irtimi \ 11< 1111 n^inp the validity of title to 
pi opei ty the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) obtained by condemnation It 
also ordered Plaintiff to immediately release the iik 
concerning the subject property. Plauiii I'l's i ,n . • 
uoii uvcr ihc • real under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A 4-103(2Vi) (West Supp., 2009) and the order of May 5, 2009, transferring the 
matter" from the I Jtah Supreme Court, 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. The trial court correctly determined that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (now Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-2-311), permitting actions to be brought within eight years to enforce 
court judgments, does not invalidate title recorded after that time by UDOT to lawfully 
condemned real property. See R. 192-95. 
Standard of Review: As a question of law, the proper interpretation and 
application of a statute is reviewed for correctness. Otter Creek Reservoir Co, v. New 
Escalante Irrigation Co., 2009 UT 16, H 5, 203 P.3d 1015; In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118, 
U6,208P.3dl058. 
2. The trial court correctly ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13 (now Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-2-216) prevents Plaintiff from obtaining title by adverse possession to 
property held for public use. See R. 274-76. 
Standard of Review: This issue shares the same standard of review cited above. 
3. The trial court properly rejected Plaintiffs claim based on the equitable doctrine 
of laches because it had not been properly raised in the Second Amended Complaint. It 
also correctly rejected the claim of equitable estoppel because Plaintiff established neither 
reasonable reliance on a clear and specific government representation nor resulting injury. 
See R. 560-63. Finally, the court correctly denied the claims of constructive trust and 
money had and received because UDOT did not improperly receive any money or 
property and Plaintiff suffered no injury. See R. 560-63. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional piovisions. >iaiuies <> ,; . ..*. . . 
issues beloic tin l ouil c-< i UIII.MIM d M> »' I >h "I flu1- b'ief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Pjuintitf tiled the cuij^iu, 
the ,; -- ' ) • court order in a condemnation 
i\. l-iz.. iTie basis of the complaint was UDOT's failure to record its title to the 
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property in Weber County within eight years of the judgment, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-22 (now section 78B-2-311); Plaintiff contended that, absent recording, the 
judgment lapsed and later recording was ineffective to transfer title to UDOT. Plaintiff 
then amended the complaint to add causes of action for unconstitutional taking and 
mutual mistake, R. 16-28, and UDOT moved for judgment on the pleadings, R. 45-81. 
The trial court initially denied the motion as to the two added claims, R. 170-71, but, in a 
subsequent ruling, dismissed both the quiet title claim, to the extent it was based on 
untimely recording, and the takings claim. R. 192-95. The court permitted the quiet title 
claim, to the extent based on adverse possession, and the claim of mutual mistake to go 
forward. UDOT then filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the 
adverse possession claim, R. 204-12, which the court granted by order of August 4, 2008. 
R. 274-76. 
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint a second time, R. 266-70, and the parties 
stipulated that the complaint could be amended to include the equitable doctrines of 
laches, equitable estoppel, equitable recoupment, money had and received, and 
constructive trust. R. 271-73. After the Second Amended Complaint was filed, 
R. 279-86, UDOT again moved for judgment on the pleadings, this time as to the 
equitable claims, R. 299-311, and moved separately for partial summary judgment on the 
claim of mutual mistake. R. 335-459 and 469-71. The trial court granted summary 
judgment on the mutual mistake claim by order of February 9, 2009, R. 524-33, and 
granted judgment on the pleadings as to the equitable claims by order of March 23, 2009. 
4 
R. 560-563. Final judgment for UDOT was entered on March 23, 2009. R. 564-66. This 
appeal ensued. R. 569-71. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
In 1974, UDOT obtained ownership, through condemnation, of certain real 
property belonging to Edwin Higley. The trial court in the condemnation action entered a 
Final Order of Condemnation on February 25, 1974, which included the parcel here at 
issue. R. 6-12. Most of the property lay within Davis County; however, the subject 
parcel lay partially within the boundaries of Weber County. R. 11-12 (Parcel No. 
80N-6:49:S). Despite this fact, the court order explicitly "ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that a copy of this final order of condemnation be filed with the county 
recorder of Davis County, State of Utah," and that the property interests identified in the 
order and at issue here would thereupon vest in UDOT in fee simple. R. 7. Plaintiff 
conceded that UDOT promptly complied with this requirement. R. 216. 
As an interim use, UDOT leased property, including the subject parcel, to 
Northern Arizona University for nature studies. R. 444-52. In late fall of 2002, a 
university research student advised UDOT Right of Way Agent Craig Fox of construction 
activity on the property. R. 486. Fox investigated and discovered that, for unknown 
reasons, the Final Order of Condemnation was not recorded in the Weber County 
Recorder's Office. R. 486. As a result of the investigation, UDOT recorded its interest 
in the parcel with that office on January 16, 2003. R. 6 and 486. Plaintiff claims to have 
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paid property taxes on the parcel to Weber County "for a considerable period of time" 
preceding recording. R. 316. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff claims that because UDOT failed to record its property interest in the 
parcel with Weber County within eight years of the condemnation judgment, the 
judgment is without force and effect. However, Plaintiff relies on a statute, Utah Code 
78B-2-311 (formerly Utah Code Ann. 78-12-22), that is inapplicable. Both the current 
and former provisions are contained in chapters of the code governing statutes of 
limitations; the chapters are further subdivided into subparts. In both cases, the subpart 
containing the eight-year statute of limitations governs actions to enforce judgments 
relating to other than real property claims. Because the judgment plaintiff attacks is one 
relating to real property, it is governed by a different subpart of the chapter. As to 
Plaintiffs citation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-15 to show that title to condemned property 
does not vest until recorded in the county where the property is located, the trial court 
concluded that this statute does not limit the time for recording. As the court observed, 
the judgment was recorded in January, 2003, and UDOT has complied with all statutory 
requirements to perfect its title. Plaintiff provides no legal authority mandating a 
different outcome. 
Plaintiffs argument on adverse possession fares no better. As UDOT revealed to 
the trial court, it was Mr. Higley who first urged UDOT to acquire the contested acreage 
because condemnation of the nine acres actually needed for highway construction would 
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leave the remaining parcel relatively valueless. UDOT did so under statutory authority 
permitting it to acquire an entire tract of land if the portion needed renders the remainder 
of little value. Because the property was, at Mr. Higleyfs insistence, obtained for a public 
purpose, it is likewise held for public benefit, contrary to plaintiffs assertion, and is 
therefore not subject to adverse possession-particularly by the estate of the owner who 
compelled its condemnation. 
Under these circumstances, equity does not require a remedy. Mr. Higley, as the 
owner who urged and accepted compensation for the parcel, had reason to know he was 
not liable for the property taxes Weber County erroneously assessed. Moreover, UDOT 
did not receive any of the tax money Plaintiff claims Mr. Higley paid. If any refund is 
due, it must come from Weber County, the entity that collected it-but that entity is not a 
party to this case. In addition, Plaintiff fails to address the trial court's conclusion that the 
theory of laches was not pleaded in the Second Amended Complaint and was therefore 
not properly before the court for decision. Nor does Plaintiff acknowledge that equitable 
estoppel against the State requires reliance on a clear and specific government 
representation, not merely an omission. The delayed recording of UDOT's property 
interest is not an affirmative representation that can support an estoppel claim. Finally, 
Plaintiff fails to show any error in the court's determination that UDOT has not 
improperly received either money or property that would support a claim of money had 
and received or constructive trust. 
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Because Plaintiff has shown neither error nor abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
rulings, there is no basis for reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UDOT'S 
TITLE TO THE CONDEMNED PROPERTY DOES NOT DEPEND ON 
RECORDING ITS INTEREST WITHIN EIGHT YEARS. 
Both in the trial court and on appeal, Plaintiff has contended that because the 
condemnation judgment remained unrecorded in Weber County for more than eight years, 
title to the parcel at issue did not vest in UDOT. The trial court concluded that this 
argument fails for three reasons. First, the court observed that the concepts of ownership 
and recording are legally distinct. As the court stated, "Recording a document conveying 
ownership of property is usually not a prerequisite for ownership of that property." 
R. 183. The court noted that under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-15 (now section 78B-6-516), 
condemned property does not change hands until the judgment is recorded, but further 
observed that this provision contains no time limit for recording. The court concluded 
that because recording is not "an action" as contemplated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 
(now section 78B-2-311), this statute likewise imposes no time requirement on recording, 
and UDOT's 2003 recording was consequently valid. Second, the court ruled that failure 
to bring an action to enforce a judgment within the eight-year statute of limitations is not 
a cause of action, but a defense to an action. Third, the court determined that the 
limitations statute is inapplicable because quiet title claims are not subject to the statute of 
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limitations. The court cited Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, 
144 P.3d 1129, to support its conclusion. 
Plaintiffs appellate brief addresses none of these conclusions. The sole case cited, 
Carolina Power & Light Company v. Bowman, 228 N.C. 319, 45 S.E.2d 531 (1947), does 
nothing to illuminate the appropriate result under Utah law and the different 
circumstances present in this action. The Bowman case involved an easement, not title in 
fee simple, and was brought by the holder of the easement against bona fide purchasers 
for value. 45 S.E.2d at 532. By contrast, the present case is brought not by the record 
holder of the interest at stake, UDOT, but by the estate of the very person who both 
sought and accepted compensation for condemnation of the parcel. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the eight-year statute of limitations for 
actions on judgments does not apply to Plaintiffs action. The court's rationale is that 
Utah precedent exempts quiet title claims from the operation of a limitations statute. But 
there is an even more basic reason to affirm the court's decision: the statute, as codified 
both currently and formerly, does not govern real property claims at all. The Utah Code 
currently collects statutes of limitations in Title 78B, Chapter 2. Chapter 2 contains three 
subparts. Part 1 covers "General Provisions and Special Actions;" Part 2 applies to "Real 
Property" actions. Part 3, in which the legislature placed the eight-year statute of 
limitations on actions to enforce judgments, specifically governs claims "Other Than Real 
Property." Consequently, it has no application to claims involving real property. The 
structure of the former Title 78 is similar. Statutes of limitation were collected in Chapter 
9 
12, which had three articles: Article 1, captioned "Real Property;" Article 2, captioned 
"Other Than Real Property," where the eight-year provision for actions to enforce 
judgments is found; and Article 3, which contains "Miscellaneous Provisions." 
There is a further reason that the statute of limitations does not bar UDOTfs 
recording of title more than eight years after entry of the condemnation judgment. As 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-101(1) (West Supp. 2009), "[t]he word factionf as 
used in this chapter includes counterclaims and cross-complaints and all other civil 
actions in which affirmative relief is sought." UDOT's 2003 recording of title in Weber 
County to the parcel here at issue does not fit within this statutory definition. UDOT was 
not seeking affirmative relief of any kind. It merely took the clerical steps necessary to 
register its ownership interest. The result is the same under the former version of the 
section. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-46 (West 2004) stated, "The word ?action,f as used in 
this chapter, is to be construed, whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special 
proceeding of a civil nature." This Court has concluded that, although "special 
proceeding" is undefined by statute, "it apparently applies to proceedings in courts of 
justice or quasi-judicial bodies in which the rights of the parties thereto are determined, 
but which proceedings were not known as common law actions or proceedings in equity." 
Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Comm% 110 Utah 426, 439, 174 P.2d 984, 990 (1946). At 
no time has a purely clerical act such as the recording of a property interest been deemed 
a "special proceeding" under this now-superseded language. 
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Nor does Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-202(l) (West Supp. 2009) support plaintiffs 
argument. Under this section, ff[jJudgments shall continue for eight years from the date of 
entry in a court unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is 
stayed in accordance with law." This statute governs the application of judicial liens to 
the real property of judgment debtors for the satisfaction of money judgments. Plaintiffs 
brief mention of the statute is devoid of any analysis showing how it would apply to non-
monetary judgments. See Aplt. Brief at 8. Moreover, subsection 202(7) of the statute, 
which requires recording of judgments, is limited to judgments entered after July 1, 2002, 
and, under subsection (7)(d), explicitly makes state agencies "exempt from the recording 
requirements of Subsection (7)(a)." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-202(7)(d) (West Supp. 
2009). If this statute carries any persuasive authority, the exemption evinces a legislative 
intent that judgments in favor of the State are not invalidated by lapse of time even if they 
are unrecorded. The former version of this statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 (West 
2004), contains the same exemption. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-201 (West Supp. 2009) does not save Plaintiffs 
quiet title claim. This statute sets out two circumstances under which the State is 
precluded from bringing an action based on its title to real property. Plaintiff overlooks 
the fact that the State has brought no action, in violation of the statute or otherwise; 
instead, it is defending against the action brought by Plaintiff. The statute has no 
applicability here. 
As the trial court cogently summarized, 
11 
The fact that UDOT received its title to the property by order of a court is 
the basis for UDOT's claim to ownership. However, that fact does not 
change the nature of this case from one quieting title to one enforcing a 
judgment for the purposes of the statute of limitations. 
R. 185. Plaintiff has failed to show error in this decision. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ADVERSELY POSSESS PROPERTY HELD FOR 
PUBLIC USE. 
Plaintiffs argument on adverse possession rests on the premise that UDOT 
permitted its condemnation judgment to lapse. See Aplt. Brief at 11. As shown in Point 
I, above, that premise is flawed. Plaintiff further states that Mr. Higley "developed a 
portion of the property supposedly under the condemnation order into lots and sold them 
to various parties." Aplt. Brief at 11-12. However, no development has taken place on 
the property at issue in this case. The legality of any development activity by Mr. Higley 
on other property purchased by and awarded to UDOT under the same condemnation 
order has no bearing here.1 
Plaintiffs argument likewise depends on another unsupportable premise: that the 
property is not held for a public purpose. This premise is contrary to applicable statutes, 
case law, and the explicit language of the condemnation order under which UDOT 
acquired the property. 
*In fact, the legality of the development activities to which Plaintiff refers is 
currently under litigation in Kappos v. State of Utah, Department of Transportation, No. 
060902775 (2d Dist., Weber County, Ogden Dep't). 
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The starting point of Plaintiff s analysis of the adverse possession claim is Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-2-216 (formerly Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13). That statute prohibits 
adverse possession against 
any property held by a town, city, or county and designated for public use 
as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or any other 
public purpose, unless the town, city, or county has sold, or otherwise 
disposed of, and conveyed the property to a purchaser for valuable 
consideration, and more than seven years subsequent to that conveyance the 
purchaser or the purchaser's grantees or successors in interest, have been in 
the exclusive, continuous, and adverse possession of the real estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-216 (West Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).2 Plaintiff argues that 
"[t]he land in question has never been used by the State for a public purpose[,]" Aplt 
Brief at 13, and should therefore be subject to adverse possession. 
Even if the Court were to accept Plaintiffs position, Plaintiff has not met the 
criteria for adverse possession under the statute. There is no evidence of record showing 
that UDOT has conveyed the property to Plaintiff for any consideration whatsoever. To 
the extent that Plaintiff has paid taxes on the property, those taxes were not paid to 
UDOT, but were assessed by and paid to Weber County, which does not hold title to the 
2Plaintiff has not argued on appeal that the statute does not apply to the State. 
However, it has long been established "that, as a general rule, adverse or prescriptive 
rights cannot be acquired as against the sovereign." Pioneer Inv.& Trust Co. v. Bd. of 
Educ, 35 Utah 1, 99 P. 150, 152 (1909); see also Provo City v. Jacobsen, 111 Utah 39, 
176 P.2d 130,144 (1947) (Larson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he State is acting in a 
governmental capacity when it holds lands in trust for the people[,]ff and compiling court 
cases, including Pioneer Investment, holding that under such circumstances, there can be 
no adverse possession against the State). 
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property. But Plaintiffs underlying assertion that the property is not held for a public 
purpose is contrary to Utah law. 
While citing California cases to support the argument that adverse possession 
should be permitted against property assertedly not used for public purposes, Plaintiff 
omits any mention of two recent Utah precedents. In Nyman v. Anchor Development, 
2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357, the Utah Supreme Court considered a claim of adverse 
possession against property acquired by Summit County in a tax sale. Nyman claimed to 
have occupied the property during the 24-year period of county ownership. Observing 
that "restrictions on adverse possession claims against states or their political subdivisions 
stem from the 'ancient doctrine1 of nullum tempus occurrit regi, or 'time does not run 
against the king[,],M the court rejected the claim. Nyman, 2003 UT 27, ^  10 (quoting 
Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 124 N.J. 570, 592 A.2d 199, 201-02 (1991)). In response 
to Nyman!s argument that the statute did not apply because the property was used for a 
private garage, not a public purpose, the court held that taking title to property for non-
payment of taxes is a public purpose: "the public purpose of safeguarding public 
revenues." Id., 2003 UT 27, ] 12. 
More recently, in Fries v. Martin, 2006 UT App 514, 154 P.3d 184, this Court 
grappled with a claim of adverse possession against property that was originally used as a 
county alley. When the alley fell into disuse, the owners of the Martin property included 
it within their fence line, which remained unchanged for at least forty years. Ultimately, 
the county formally vacated the alleyway, and the county assessor added portions of the 
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property to the abutting lots. Martin refused to vacate the property, claiming title based 
on her exclusive possession and control of the property for the preceding seventeen years, 
as well as the payment of property taxes over the same period. The Court rejected the 
claim, noting that Munder Utah law, the alley could not cease to be held for public use by 
mere abandonment or nonuse because real property designated as public use can only 
cease to be such by formal vacation." Fries, 2006 UT App 514, ^  8. Martin's possession 
and control were ineffective because they preceded the date on which the county formally 
vacated the alleyway. As the Court explained, 
property dedicated for public use is considered to be held for public use 
even if the county does not use it for that purpose, and the formal vacation 
rule applies. See Henderson, 657 P.2d at 1268, 1270 (holding that property 
designated for public use was subject to the formal vacation rule, even 
though the property was "never . . . developed as a road and remain[ed] 
essentially in its natural state, covered by trees and shrubs"). 
Id. at If 9 (alterations in original) (quoting Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 657 P.2d 1268, 1270 
(Utah 1982)). 
There is no basis on which to distinguish these precedents from the circumstances 
in the present appeal. UDOT obtained the property at issue through lawful condemnation 
and for a public purpose. It has not vacated its interest. Neither Mr. Higleyfs claimed 
payment of property taxes nor his asserted presence on the property alters these 
uncontested facts. Under Nyman and Fries, Plaintiffs adverse possession must fail, as the 
trial court correctly ruled. 
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Plaintiff overlooks a second statute that addresses UDOT's condemnation powers. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-113 (West 2004),3 
If a part of an entire lot, block, tract of land, or interest or 
improvement in real property is to be acquired by the department and the 
remainder is to be left in a shape or condition of little value to its owner or 
to give rise to claims or litigation concerning damages, the department may 
acquire the whole of the property and may sell the remainder or may 
exchange it for other property needed for highway purposes. 
That is precisely what happened here. As explained in the trial court, Mr. Higley, during 
the condemnation proceedings, urged condemnation of the entire parcel on the basis that 
the property remaining after condemnation of the portion needed for highway 
construction would be essentially valueless. R. 336, 440, 511. UDOT agreed to do as 
Mr. Higley requested, and the Final Order of Condemnation correctly reflects that the 
property is granted to UDOT in fee simple "for the purpose described and set forth in the 
plaintiffs complaint, i.e., for the use of the plaintiff, the State of Utah, for highway 
purposes." R. 108. 
In short, UDOT's ownership of the property is supported by statute, precedent, and 
court order. Plaintiff has failed to establish any facts that would entitle it to adverse 
possession against UDOT?s title. For these reasons, there are no grounds on which to 
disturb the trial court's judgment in favor of UDOT on this claim. 
3The statute in effect at the time of the condemnation proceedings was 
substantively identical. See Utah Code § 27-12-99 (Michie 1990). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
PLAINTIFF, HAVING SUFFERED NO COGNIZABLE INJURY, WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE REMEDY. 
Plaintiff challenges the trial court's rejection of four specific equitable theories: 
laches, equitable estoppel, money had and received, and constructive trust. Each of these 
theories relies on Plaintiffs asserted payment of property taxes to Weber County, and 
each fails for the same reason: UDOT did not receive or benefit from any property taxes 
paid by Mr. Higley. Rather than addressing this deficiency, Plaintiff reasserts the same 
arguments made unsuccessfully in the trial court. 
A. Laches 
The trial court correctly observed that Plaintiff failed to bring a claim of laches in 
the Second Amended Complaint. R. 562. The court further ruled that the doctrine of 
laches is an affirmative defense, not a cause of action. Plaintiffs own argument supports 
this principle. Of the three cases Plaintiff cites, two involve laches as a bar to recovery, 
and the third contains no mention of laches at all. 
In Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 
535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff sought enforcement of a restrictive easement 
against the defendants, who "urge[d] laches as a bar to enforcement by plaintiffs." 535 
P.2d at 1260. The defendants claimed that laches prevented the plaintiff from enforcing 
its easement against defendants' encroachment because the plaintiff had failed to do so 
when a sign announcing the encroaching construction was first posted on the property. 
Rejecting the defendants' theory, the supreme court explained that "[t]o constitute laches, 
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two elements must be established: (1) The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff, (2) 
An injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence.'1 Id. (emphasis added). The case 
provides no basis to treat laches as an independent cause of action. 
Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 
720 (Utah 1990), yields the same result. In that case, the plaintiff mining companies 
sought declaratory judgment as to their liability for royalties under coal leases. One 
plaintiff argued that laches barred any recovery by the State. The supreme court ruled the 
plaintiffs claim of laches inapplicable against the State defendant, observing that the 
plaintiff was the defaulting party. 802 P.2d at 731. Similarly, Plaintiff in the present case 
is the party in violation of UDOT's existing property rights under court order and 
recorded title. As in Plateau Mining, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable here. 
Finally, Plaintiffs citation to Bailey-Allen Company v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah 
App. 1997), is unavailing. The word "laches" appears nowhere in the opinion; instead, 
the case raises a claim of unjust enrichment. However, Plaintiff did not assert a claim of 
unjust enrichment in the Second Amended Complaint, and Plaintiffs brief does not 
challenge the trial court's ruling that 
Plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment fails to state a claim for which relief 
may be granted because it is also in violation of Rule 15(a), Ut. R. Civ. 
Proc, where Plaintiffs Motion to Amend never sought, nor was Plaintiff 
ever granted leave of the Court to add this cause of action and Defendant 
never agreed to add it as part of the July 9, 2008 Stipulation between the 
parties. Also, even if Plaintiff s claim of unjust enrichment were allowed to 
be plead [sic], it fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted 
because there was no improper benefit conferred upon UDOT and Plaintiff 
suffered no injury. 
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R.561-62. 
Plaintiff has not identified any case permitting the use of laches as an independent 
cause of action and has not shown error in the trial court's ruling that laches was not pled 
in the Second Amended Complaint. For these reasons, the court's ruling warrants 
affirmance. 
B. Equitable Estoppel 
Plaintiffs argument on equitable estoppel, like the argument on laches, ignores the 
basis of the trial court's ruling: that "there is no clear and specific written government 
representation claimed to be relied on; no reasonable reliance; and no injury to Plaintiff." 
R. 562. Plaintiff recites the elements of laches as articulated in Rothey v. Walker Bank & 
Trust Company, 754 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1988): "(1) a representation, act or omission, 
(2) justifiable reliance, and (3) a change of position to one's detriment based on that 
reliance." This formulation ignores the distinction between estoppel asserted against a 
private party and estoppel asserted against the government. 
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity." 
Anderson v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992). The Anderson 
court observed that "[t]he few cases in which Utah courts have permitted estoppel against 
the government have involved very specific written representations by authorized 
government entities." Id. Thus, in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the supreme court upheld estoppel against the 
Liquor Commission after the plaintiff spent approximately $200,000 developing its 
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premises in reliance on the Commission's written representation that the location satisfied 
statutory requirements. In Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671 (Utah 
App. 1990), this Court affirmed estoppel against the Retirement Board after Eldredge 
relied on the Board's oral and written representations that he would be credited with years 
of public employment accrued before a temporary break in that employment. Plaintiff 
has identified no specific representation by UDOT-written or otherwise-that would 
support the application of equitable estoppel here. 
Moreover, the Court has ruled that where a claim of estoppel is based on an 
omission, "[m]ere 'silence or inaction will not operate to work an estoppel.'" Town ofAlta 
v. Ben Home Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Utah County v. Young, 
615 P.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Utah 1980)). Plaintiffs estoppel claim is based on an omission: 
"In this situation, the State of Utah omitted to record the condemnation order and failed to 
do so for a period of at least 29 years." Aplt. Brief at 18. But under Town ofAlta, 
UDOT's mere inaction is an insufficient basis for estoppel. 
In the absence of a specific representation or affirmative conduct by UDOT, 
Plaintiff cannot meet the elements of equitable estoppel. The payment of taxes to a 
different government entity does not alter this analysis. The trial court correctly 
determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on the basis of equitable estoppel, and 
nothing in Plaintiffs argument on this point shows error. 
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C. Money Had and Received 
Plaintiff briefly argues that money had and received is a valid cause of action 
under Utah law. Plaintiff does not identify the elements of such a claim, but asserts that, 
but for UDOT's delayed recording of its condemnation judgment, Mr. Higley would not 
have paid taxes on the property at issue, and UDOT should therefore reimburse the estate 
for all taxes paid, plus interest. Plaintiff further asserts, without supporting authority, that 
general equitable principles should permit it "to recoup the property itself." Aplt. Brief at 
20. 
The case on which Plaintiff relies to validate this cause of action does not address 
the substance of a claim of money had and received. In CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, 
2001 UT 37, T| 20, 24 P.3d 966, the supreme court was faced with the question of what 
statute of limitations to apply to an action for recovery of excess royalty payments. The 
court held that the claim was one for money had and received and was therefore subject to 
a four-year statute of limitations. Relevant to the present appeal, the plaintiff in that case 
sought to recover from the State money that it had paid to the State. 
Unlike the plaintiff in CIG Exploration, Plaintiff here seeks reimbursement from 
UDOT of money paid to a different entity: Weber County. Whatever claim Plaintiff may 
have to the money paid to that entity, there is simply no basis for recovery against UDOT. 
As explained by the federal district court in a case based on the same facts as the Utah 
case cited by Plaintiff, "a claim for monies had and received is based on the theory that 
one has money in hand belonging to another which, in equity and with good conscience, 
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should be paid over." CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Hill, 824 F. Supp, 1532, 1546 (D. Utah 
1993). UDOT has never had in hand any tax money paid on the property by Mr. Higley. 
Plaintiff has provided no authority supporting reimbursement under such circumstances. 
D. Constructive Trust 
Finally, Plaintiff seeks recovery of any tax money paid by Mr. Higley under a 
theory of constructive trust. Plaintiff argues that it "meets this cause of action because the 
wrongful act is the State's omission of recording its own condemnation order and the 
State now is being unjustly enriched by attempting to take the property back in full." 
Aplt. Brief at 20. Plaintiff once again fails to address the basis for the trial court's ruling: 
that UDOT did not improperly receive any money or property, and that Plaintiff suffered 
no injury. R. 562. 
Plaintiff cites Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Company, 2007 UT 39, \ 34, 164 P.3d 353, 
for the elements of a claim for constructive trust as a matter of equity: "(1) a wrongful 
act, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) specific property that can be traced to the wrongful 
behavior." Plaintiff omits the sentence that follows this enumeration: "Such trusts are 
usually imposed where injustice would result if a party were able to keep money or 
property that belonged to another." Id. Further, "[t]o establish a wrongful act under Utah 
law, an entity must have obviously received funds by mistake or participated in active or 
egregious misconduct." Id. at f^ 35. 
Like the defendant in Wilcox, Plaintiff has failed to establish the requisite elements 
of a constructive trust. First, as the trial court recognized, UDOT did not receive funds by 
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mistake; in fact, it did not receive funds at all. Any tax money paid by Mr. Higley was 
paid to Weber County, not to UDOT. At no time did UDOT receive or benefit from those 
funds. Nor did UDOT participate in active or egregious conduct. For unknown reasons, 
its interest in the property for which it paid Mr. Higley went unrecorded in Weber 
County for a period of time. On learning of this omission, UDOT immediately 
investigated and remedied it. UDOT's assertion of its rights over the property it 
purchased from Mr. Higley has not unjustly enriched it. If anything, Plaintiff has been 
unjustly enriched by Mr. Higley's activity on property for which he sought and accepted 
compensation and which UDOT owns in fee simple. Under these circumstances, any 
injury claimed by Plaintiff is self-inflicted. Plaintiffs brief argument does nothing to 
undermine the correctness of the trial court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time of the condemnation proceedings, Mr. Higley urged UDOT to acquire 
the property at issue because condemnation of the portion UDOT needed would leave the 
remaining property of little value. UDOT acquiesced and paid Mr. Higley for the entire 
parcel, as reflected in the condemnation order. It also recorded its interest in Davis 
County, as the order explicitly directed. On learning that its interest remained unrecorded 
in Weber County, UDOT took immediate and timely steps to correct the omission. 
Despite Mr. Higley's acceptance of compensation for the property, his estate has 
attempted to invalidate UDOT's title on the premise that, for a period of time, Mr. Higley 
paid to Weber County taxes it erroneously assessed against the property. The trial court 
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correctly ruled that none of Plaintiff s theories supported Plaintiffs desired outcome, and 
Plaintiff has shown no error in this result. For these reasons, as fully explained above, 
UDOT respectfully asks the Court to affirm the final judgment dismissing this action in 
its entirety, with prejudice, and ordering the immediate release of the lis pendens on the 
subject property. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
To avoid any potential confusion between the property at issue in this case and 
other property under separate litigation stemming from the same underlying 
condemnation action, UDOT respectfully requests oral argument in this appeal. 
DATED this23ifaL day of October, 2009. 
/ L^ V — £ ^ 
Nancy L>Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF EDWIN HIGLEY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Civil No. 060902417 
Judge W. Brent West 
All of Plaintiff s claims in this action having been previously dismissed, with prejudice, 
by this Court; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, JUDGED AND DECREED (1) that Plaintiffs action is 
dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice, and FINAL JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF; and (2) that Plaintiff is ordered to immediately release the filed and recorded Lis 
Pendens concerning the subject property. .foment 
\irs~>Qi'7An')4 nanes: 3 
tCONDCISTFIiCT COURT 
2MJKAR23 AH 10=05 
m 3 2JK8 
Each party is to pay their own attorney fees and costs in regards to this action. 
Dated this _?£_ day of_Fehr«aryT"2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
N 
W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
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